CompanyGraph
L3Harris Technologies Inc.
LHX · NYSE Arca · United States
Builds the classified jamming software and radio hardware used by the U.S. Army and Navy inside the same secure facilities.
L3Harris Technologies develops the classified software algorithms that jam enemy radar and radio signals, and builds the physical hardware those algorithms run on, all inside the same government-authorized secure facilities in Melbourne, Florida. Because the algorithm has to be tuned against classified threat signatures stored in government-controlled libraries that cannot leave a SCIF-certified facility, the engineers writing the code and the engineers building the radio hardware must work in the same cleared building — iterating each against the other until the combined system can be certified against real threat data. Once that certified system is embedded in an Army radio network or a Navy AEGIS combat platform, replacing it would trigger a multi-year requalification process and require a new supplier to earn its own NSA cryptographic certification before it could slot in, which means Harris hardware tends to stay locked into platforms for decades. The whole business depends on keeping those Melbourne facilities authorized and the cleared-engineering workforce intact — if DoD restricted access to the threat libraries or suspended personnel clearances following a security incident, the closed loop between algorithm development and hardware design would break, and neither side of it could be rebuilt somewhere else.
How does this company make money?
Harris earns money in stages. First, the government awards a multi-year development contract at a fixed price, covering the work of building and certifying a new system. When the system moves into production, Harris collects a set fee for each unit of hardware delivered. After the system is deployed, Harris holds separate long-term sustainment contracts — collecting ongoing payments for software updates and maintenance over system lifecycles that can stretch across decades.
What makes this company hard to replace?
Replacing a Harris system inside an existing military network would trigger a multi-year DoD requalification process before a new system could be approved for use. Harris hardware is integrated with NSA cryptographic keys that govern secure communications — a new supplier would need its own NSA certification before it could slot in. Systems built into the Navy's AEGIS and other combat platforms are deeply tied to existing software interfaces that would require extensive and costly integration testing to replace.
What limits this company?
Everything depends on having enough engineers who hold the right security clearances and can work inside qualified SCIF facilities. That work cannot be handed to outside contractors, automated, or moved to a different building. The number of cleared engineers Harris can put inside those rooms on any given day sets a hard ceiling on how fast new electronic warfare capabilities can be built and certified.
What does this company depend on?
Harris cannot operate without U.S. government security clearances that allow its engineers to access classified EW algorithms. It also relies on specialized RF semiconductors sourced from a small number of DoD-qualified suppliers, SCIF-certified facilities for all classified development work, FAA and FCC spectrum allocation certifications, and ITAR export control licenses for any international sales.
Who depends on this company?
U.S. Army tactical radio networks depend on Harris for encrypted communication in environments where adversaries are actively trying to jam or intercept signals. Navy AEGIS missile defense systems depend on Harris for the electronic countermeasures that protect ships against incoming threats. Allied forces in NATO countries depend on Harris for electronic warfare and communication systems that work alongside U.S. equipment — if Harris stopped, those forces would lose that compatibility.
How does this company scale?
Once a classified algorithm has been developed and certified, it can be loaded onto multiple hardware platforms without rebuilding it from scratch — that part scales well. What does not scale is the underlying development work: writing and refining the algorithms, and integrating them with new hardware, still requires cleared engineers inside authorized SCIF facilities. As the company grows, that personnel constraint grows with it.
What external forces can significantly affect this company?
ITAR export control rules restrict which countries Harris can sell to and require licenses for every international deal, limiting how large the international business can grow. If Congress imposes federal budget sequestration, DoD procurement budgets shrink and program funding can be cut or delayed. Chinese semiconductor supply chain restrictions can block access to components Harris needs for its radio hardware, forcing the company to qualify alternative sources — a slow and expensive process.
Where is this company structurally vulnerable?
If DoD revoked Harris's facility authorizations, suspended security clearances for key personnel, or cut off access to its threat libraries — whether because of a security incident, a policy change, or a cleared-personnel crisis at Melbourne — the closed loop between algorithm development and hardware design would break. Neither side of that work can be picked up and moved somewhere else. The integrated capability would stop.
Supply Chain
Aerospace Supply Chain
The aerospace supply chain is governed by three root constraints that interact to produce extreme concentration, decades-long supplier lock-in, and a system where every component must be traceable from raw material to flight: certification requirements make every part a regulated article, product lifecycles measured in decades force suppliers to support platforms long after production ends, and integration complexity across millions of parts from thousands of suppliers creates coordination demands that few organizations can manage.
Defense Supply Chain
The defense supply chain is governed by three root constraints that interact to produce extreme supplier concentration, glacial production timelines, and a system where political decisions — not market demand — determine what gets built and how much: monopsony buyer structure means the government is typically the only customer, security classification requirements restrict who can manufacture, supply, and even know what is being produced, and production rate inflexibility means defense manufacturing runs at low volumes with specialized tooling where surge capacity barely exists because maintaining idle lines for contingencies has no commercial justification.